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NOTES
Constitutional Protection of Commercial Speech
Over the course of the past seven years, the Supreme Court has aban-
doned a legal regime affording no first amendment I protection to commercial
speech; 2 flirted with a standard under which, arguably, all true, nonmislead-
ing commercial speech that did not relate to illegal activity was fully pro-
tected; 3 and settled on a purportedly definitive rule granting commercial
speech a lesser, limited measure of protection 4 commensurate with its "subor-
dinate position"5 among classes of protected speech. The difficulty with the
Court's analysis, however, is that at no point during its legal wanderings has it
ever articulated sturdy rationales to support its holdings. Instead, it has
seemed to decide each case on its facts, deciding first the desired results and
manipulating-or creating-doctrine to fit.6  In its most important recent
1. "Congress shall make no law .. abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press ......
U.S. Const. amend. I.
2. Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942); see also Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622
(1951). The initial problem presented in dealing with commercial speech is that of definition. Two
ingredients must at a minimum be present. The first is one of content: the speech must tend to
promote the purchasing of goods or services. The second is one of motivation: the purpose of the
speech must be the advancement of the financial interests of the speaker via that transaction.
Economic motivation alone can never be sufficient to classify speech as commercial. Newspa-
pers, professional authors, and paid public speakers all have at least partly economic motivation
in disseminating their speech, yet that, without more, does not make that speech in any way
commercial. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265-66 (1964). This point is still
occasionally missed. See, e.g., Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l, Inc., 431 U.S. 678, 716-17 (1977)
(Stevens, J., concurring) (characterizing "the business of exhibiting [sexually explicit] motion
pictures for profit" as commercial speech). Similarly, commercial content alone is insufficient-
Consumer Reports is not in the same category, for first amendment purposes, as product
advertising. Hence, it is the combination of the two elements that is the key.
For commercial speech analysis to come into play at all, the good or service, such as religious
material or books, cannot itself be independently protected by the first amendment. See Heffron
v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640 (1981) (religious material); Breard
v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 690 (1951) (Black, J., dissenting) (magazine subscriptions). For an
extensive analysis of the problem of defining commercial speech, see Comment, First Amendment
Protection for Commercial Advertising: The New Constitutional Doctrine, 44 U. Chi. L. Rev.
205, 222-36 (1976).
3. See Linmark Assocs. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977); Virginia State Bd.
of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 769-73 (1976).
4. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
5. Id. at 589 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S.
447, 455-56 (1978)).
6. See Cox, The Supreme Court, 1979 Term-Foreword: Freedom of Expression in the
Burger Court, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 26 (1980). See generally Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles
of Constitutional Law, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 10-20 (1959) (emphasizing the importance of
reasoning and analysis that transcend immediate results).
One particularly troubling branch of the law in this area is federal and state regulation of
cigarette and liquor advertising. See Cox, supra, at 34. The Federal Cigarette Labeling and
Advertising Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340 (1976) (forbidding broadcast advertising of cigarettes),
is put into question by current commercial speech doctrine. The Court has rationalized the
cigarette ban by noting "the special problems of advertising on the electronic broadcast media,"
Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 384 (1977), but the original case upholding that
prohibition, prior to the expansion of protection for commercial speech, made no such distinc-
tion. Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 582 (D.D.C. 1971), aff'd mem. sub nom.
Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Acting Attorney General, 405 U.S. 1000 (1972); see infra text
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pronouncement, Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service
Commission,7 the Court neglected to supply any rationale at all to buttress its
holding-a factor that makes the durability of that holding questionable8 and
that has contributed to a wide divergence of opinion among commentators as
to the degree of constitutional protection that commercial speech should
receive.9
This Note attempts to articulate a principled ground for protection of
commercial speech, and to consider what the scope of that protection might
be. Initially, the Note traces the history of the commercial speech doctrine in
the Supreme Court. The Note then outlines a framework of values and
interests: the values determine what kinds of speech are to be protected, and
the interests determine the scope of permissible restrictions on that speech.
Applying this framework to the question of commercial speech, the Note
concludes that commercial speech may be subject to specific types of regula-
tion-such as restriction of redundant speakers-that could not constitution-
ally be applied in other areas of speech. Any restrictions, however, placed
upon the dissemination of true and nonmisleading commercial speech, for
fear that its recipients will act on the information provided, should be subject
to the same strict scrutiny such restrictions are given elsewhere in first amend-
ment jurisprudence. 0
accompanying notes 186-90. State statutes banning liquor advertising, e.g., Fla. Stat. Ann. §
561.42(10)-(12) (West 1979); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 138, § 24 (West 1974); Utah Code Ann.
§§ 32-7-26 to -28 (1953 & Supp. 1981), may present similar difficulties for the Court. The
Oklahoma ban on liquor advertising was recently struck down as violative of first amendment
guarantees protecting.commercial speech. Oklahoma Telecasters Ass'n v. Crisp, No. Civ-81-439-
W, slip op. (W.D. Okla. Feb. 10, 1982) (available Apr. 26, 1982, on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist
file).
7. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
8. A number of lower courts have strongly indicated their uncertainty in the commercial
speech area. See, e.g., In re R.M.J., 609 S.W.2d 411, 412 (Mo. 1980) ("We are urged now by
respondent to follow the Central Hudson model. We respectfully decline to enter the thicket of
attempting to anticipate and to satisfy the subjective ad hoc judgments of a majority of the United
States Supreme Court.") (emphasis in original), rev'd, 102 S. Ct. 929 (1982).
9. Compare The Supreme Court, 1979 Term, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 164 (1980) ("Because
commercial expression furthers the same values and interests that require protection of other
forms of speech, regulation based on the content of the former should receive full constitutional
protection"), with Jackson & Jeffries, Commercial Speech: Economic Due Process and the First
Amendment, 65 Va. L. Rev. 1, 14 (1979) ("Measured in terms of traditional First Amendment
principles, commercial speech is remarkable for its insignificance.").
10. The Note discusses the constitutional protection of true, nonmisleading commercial
speech only. The Supreme Court has generally allowed close regulation of false and misleading
commercial speech on the ground that commercial speech is more durable and more easily
verifiable by its disseminator than other speech. See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564 n.6;
Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,
771-72 & n.24 (1976); id. at 777-81 (Stewart, J., concurring); Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 10
(1979). But see Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 397 (1977) (Powell, J., dissenting in
relevant part); Illinois Ass'n of Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 516 F. Supp. 1067, 1074 n.8
(N.D. 111. 1981); Farber, Commercial Speech and First Amendment Theory, 74 Nw. U.L. Rev.
372, 384-86 (1979).
The Court has used this rationale to justify a degree of regulation of commercial speech that
would be "utterly intolerable" were it to be applied to political speech. Cox, supra note 4, at 32;
see infra note 91. The content-based nature of regulation of misleading speech and the necessity,
if regulation is to be effective, of broad prophylactic rules that will screen out some protectable
speech along with the unprotectable, make the area of misleading speech one of continuing
difficulty and confusion.
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I. HISTORY OF COMMERCIAL SPEECH DOCTRINE
The Supreme Court's first efforts to protect commercial speech were
tentative; initially, the Court employed a balancing test, determining whether
the speech contained material of sufficient public interest that the benefits of
free circulation outweighed the state's police power interest in suppression."'
Its holdings soon became more firm, before long establishing what appeared
to be a solid rule that truthful and nonmisleading commercial speech was
entitled to undiluted first amendment protection.12 By 1979 the Court had
begun to retreat from that position 13 until, in Central Hudson Gas & Electric
Corp. v. Public Service Commission, 4 it declared that restrictions designed to
keep true commercial information from the public were legitimate in appro-
priate circumstances. Central Hudson promulgated a rule under which courts
could treat such restrictions indistinguishably from simple "time, place, and
manner" regulations, applying a relatively relaxed intermediate standard of
review. In addition, however, the rule provided that courts should subject the
restrictions to a potentially strict "least restrictive means" test as well, thus
ensuring judicial control over individual cases. Though this analysis recog-
nizes the likelihood that countervailing public interests will often collide with
first amendment interests, it marks a shift to what may well, in future cases,
become wholly unprincipled adjudication.
A. From Chrestensen to Bigelow: The Shift from Motivation to Content
Traditional first amendment jurisprudence held commercial speech to be
wholly unworthy of protection. The Court first considered the problem in the
1942 case of Valentine v. Chrestensen,'5 rejecting a first amendment challenge
to a city ordinance prohibiting the distribution of "commercial ... [or]
business advertising matter" in the streets.' 6 The Court made it plain that
advertising, to be defined by looking at the motivation of the speaker, 17 was to
be treated as the "pursufance of] gainful occupation"' 8 only, and not as
11. Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
12. See Linmark Assocs. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977); Virginia State Bd,
of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976); infra text
accompanying notes 31-56.
13. See Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1 (1979) (broad definition of misleading speech and
suggestion, id. at 13, that even nonmisleading commercial speech is entitled to lesser protection);
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978) (commercial speech entitled to only
"limited measure of protection, commensurate with its subordinate position in the scale of First
Amendment values").
14. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
15. 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
16. Id. at 53 n.1.
17. The Court found it of little note that Chrestensen, who was distributing handbills
soliciting visitors for the Navy submarine he exhibited, attached to his handbill a protest against
the action of the local authorities in refusing him public wharfage facilities. It dismissed argu-
ments based on the partly political content of the handbill, and focused on what it saw to be the
plain motivation behind it. Id. at 55. See generally Schiro, Commercial Speech: The Demise of a
Chimera, 1976 Sup. Ct. Rev. 45, 47-48; L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 652 (1978)
("dominant motive" test for commercial speech).
18. 316 U.S. at 54.
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speech at all. Nine years later, in Breard v. Alexandria,19 the Court rejected a
challenge to an ordinance prohibiting commercial door-to-door selling, as
applied to a magazine subscription organization. The question, as the Justices
saw it, was whether freedom of the press gave magazines unique protection.
Justice Reed, writing for the Court, and Justice Black, dissenting, agreed that
"[o]f course," a seller of mere "gadgets or brushes" or "pots" could under
no circumstances claim first amendment protection. 20 Again, the Court fo-
cused on the motivation of the advertiser rather than the content of his
speech, allowing it to ignore the protected nature of the magazines he wished
to sell. 2'
This treatment of commercial speech came under increasing attack in the
years to follow,22 with the first crack in the theoretical wall appearing almost
offhandedly in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.23 The Court found in that
case that state libel criteria, as applied to an advertisement placed by a civil
rights organization, violated the first amendment. It first had to address the
argument that because the New York Times, in running the civil rights appeal,
was motivated by purely commercial interests, the advertisement constituted
mere commercial speech, beyond the ambit of first amendment protection.24
The Court disposed of that argument by looking past the Times's motivation
and focusing on the content of the speech.25 This content test assumed prime
importance in the 1975 case of Bigelow v. Virginia."6 There, the Court held
that where commercial speech contained "factual material of clear 'public
interest,' ",27 the state's ability to suppress it would turn on a weighing of the
first amendment interest served by the dissemination of the speech against the
19. 341 U.S. 622 (1951).
20. Id. at 641, 650 n.*. Chief Justice Vinson, dissenting, did not reach the issue.
21. See Schiro, supra note 17, at 54-60; cf. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943)(upholding first amendment right of Jehovah's Witnesses to sell religious materials door to door).
22. Justice Douglas in a 1959 concurring opinion characterized the Chrestensen holding as
"casual, almost offhand... [and one which] has not survived reflection," Cammarano v. United
States, 358 U.S. 498, 514 (1959) (Douglas, J., concurring), and later referred to it as "ill-
conceived" and ripe for overruling. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Grove, 404 U.S. 898, 904-06 (1971)(Douglas, J., dissenting from denial of cert.). By 1974 a majority of the members of the Court
were on record as questioning the validity of the Chrestensen holding. See Lehman v. City of
Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 314 n.6 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting) and cases cited supra.
23. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
24. Id. at 265.
25. Id. at 265-66. The Court found that the speech "communicated information, expressed
opinion, recited grievances, protested claimed abuses, and sought financial support on behalf of a
movement whose existence and objectives are matters of the highest public interest and concern,"
id. at 266, and was thus worthy of protection.
26. 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
Bigelow was the managing editor of the Virginia Weekly, a newspaper printed and distrib-
uted solely in Virginia. The Weekly ran an advertisement for the Women's Pavilion, a for-profit
New York abortion referral service. Both abortions and for-profit medical referral services were
then legal in New York, but illegal in Virginia. Bigelow was convicted for violation of a statute
making it illegal to "encourage or prompt the procuring of abortion," id. at 812-13.
27. Id. at 822. The Court reasoned that the abortion information provided by the advertise-
ment, in particular the advertisement's statement that "[a]bortions are now legal in New York"
without residency requirements, id., would be valuable not only to readers in need of abortion
services, "but also to those with a general curiosity about, or genuine interest in, the subject
matter or the law of another State and its development, and to readers seeking reform in
Virginia." Id.
1982]
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police power interest advanced by the regulation. 2  The Bigelow balancing
approach gave unprecedented protection to commercial speech.2 9  It left,
however, a good deal of leeway to the Court in future cases; where it is unclear
just how much weight should be put on each side of the scale, a balancing
approach can yield almost any desired result.3 0
B. Virginia Board and Full Protection
In 1976, with Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc.,31 the Court moved into a new era, establishing
protection for pure commercial speech, that is, speech devoid of any content
other than the proposal for a commercial transaction. 32  A Virginia statute
prohibited pharmacists from advertising prices for prescription drugs. 33 The
statute was challenged by prescription drug customers who claimed a first
amendment right to receive drug price information that pharmacists wished to
communicate to them. Justice Blackmun, writing for the Court, first spoke to
the threshold question of whether a restriction on the pharmacists' ability to
communicate could infringe a first amendment right of the consumers, and
concluded that it could.34  He went on to describe the usefulness to the
consumer of the information conveyed by commercial speech. The listener's
interest, it was explained, "may be as keen, if not keener by far, than his
interest in the day's most urgent political debate." ' 35 The legislation in ques-
28. Id. at 826; see Comment, First Amendment Protection for Commercial Speech: An
Optical Illusion?, 31 U. Fla. L. Rev. 799, 802 (1979). Justice Rehnquist dissented, in part on the
ground that "we have always refused to distinguish for First Amendment purposes on the basis of
content," and that the subject matter of the advertisement was therefore irrelevant. The speech
was still commercial advertising and as such unprotected. 421 U.S. at 831.
Content-based criteria, though, were coming into increasing vogue at the Court. Just a year
later, the Court decided Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976). In that case
a Detroit ordinance restricting the projection of sexually explicit but nonobscene films was
upheld, partly on the ground that the content of the films made them worthy of somewhat less
first amendment protection. In the course of that opinion, Justice Stevens analogized to commer-
cial speech and commented that "[t]he measure of constitutional protection to be afforded
commercial speech will surely be governed largely by the content of the communication." Id. at
68-69.
29. The Bigelow holding was, though, of limited precedential value because the independent
constitutional interest of abortion rights was implicated. Thus, Justice Blackmun, writing for the
Court, could limit his holding with the statement that "[w]e need not decide in this case the
precise extent to which the First Amendment permits regulation of advertising that is related to
activities the State may legitimately regulate or even prohibit." 421 U.S. at 825. This aspect of the
case, however, played a relatively minor role in the Court's analysis.
30. See generally L. Tribe, supra note 17, at 584; Emerson, First Amendment Doctrine and
the Burger Court, 68 Calif. L. Rev. 422, 440 (1980); Comment, supra note 41, at 804 n.35.
31. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
32. Id. at 760-61.
33. Virginia pharmacists are in general heavily regulated by the state. Only licensed pharma-
cists may dispense prescription drugs. Id. at 750-52.
34. Id. at 756-57. Justice Rehnquist, in his dissent, argued that listeners (asserting their
"right to receive") should not be able to strike down restrictions on speakers where the listeners
could reasonably go out and get the information themselves. The drug customers, he contended,
should have no standing since they, or consumer organizations, could easily get price quotes from
the pharmacists via "a phone call or a trip to the comer drugstore." 425 U.S. at 782-83. See infra
note 102.
35. Id. at 763-64.
[Vol. 82:720
COMMERCIAL SPEECH
tion, Justice Blackmun wrote, hit hardest at the poor, sick, and aged; allowing
advertising to them meant "more than a convenience. It could mean the
alleviation of physical pain or the enjoyment of basic necessities." 3 Thus, the
Court concluded, the consumer had a first amendment interest in receiving the
information. The Court continued by asserting a general societal interest in
the dissemination of information as to the availability and price of goods and
services in the marketplace. "So long as we preserve a predominantly free
enterprise economy," such information is "indispensable" to the private
economic decisions that make the economy work.
37
This analysis, however, appears to reflect interests foreign to those valued
in traditional first amendment jurisprudence. Economic efficiency and the
economic interests of consumers are important, but are akin to property
interests rather than to those related to expression or association., 8 The mere
importance of an economic interest does not as such transform it into a first
amendment interest,3 9 and it had not previously been thought that the first
amendment constitutionalized classical free-market economic theory.40 Thus,
it seems that Justice Rehnquist, dissenting, was more true than the majority to
historic first amendment concerns in rejecting these arguments as "presump-
tively ... the concern of the Virginia Legislature, which sits to balance these
and other claims in the process of making laws such as the one here under
attack."' 4'
After stating the existence of first amendment interests in commercial
communication, 42 the Court in Virginia Board reiterated the police power
36. Id.
37. Id. at 765. Individual Justices had expressed this idea before. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc.
v. Grove, 404 U.S. 898, 904-06 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting from denial of cert.); FTC v.
Proctor & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 603 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
38. See generally A. Meiklejohn, Free Speech and Its Relation to Self-Government 37-39
(1948).
39. See Virginia Board, 425 U.S. at 787 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("It is undoubtedly
arguable that many people in this country regard the choice of shampoo as just as important as
who may be elected to local, state, or national political office, but that does not automatically
bring information about competing shampoos within the protection of the First Amendment.").
40. Justice Rehnquist, arguing that "there is certainly nothing in the ... Constitution which
requires the Virginia Legislature to hew to the teachings of Adam Smith in its legislative deci-
sions," 425 U.S. at 784 (dissenting opinion), consciously echoed Justice Holmes's dissent in
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1915) ("The Fourteenth Amendment does not enact Mr.
Herbert Spencer's Social Statics.").
Justice Rehnquist's accusation that the Court was reviving the doctrine of Lochner has been
supported by a number of commentators. See, e.g., Jackson & Jeffries, supra note 9, at 30-31;
Comment, supra note 28, at 812.
41. 425 U.S. at 783 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
42. The Court also hesitantly suggested that advertising might be considered political speech,
on the ground that it is important for the formation of opinions about economic regulation.
"[E]ven if the First Amendment were thought to be primarily an instrument to enlighten public
decisionmaking in a democracy, we could not say that the free flow of information does not serve
that goal." 425 U.S. at 765 (footnotes omitted). For commentators' reactions, compare Jackson
& Jeffries, supra note 9, at 15 ("The typical newspaper advertisement or television commercial
makes no comment on governmental personnel or policy. It does not marshall information
relevant to political action, nor does it focus public attention on questions of political signifi-
cance."), and Redish, The First Amendment in the Marketplace: Commercial Speech and the
Values of Free Expression, 39 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 429, 438 (1971) ("It may well be that
commercial speech does not, even indirectly, aid the public in the performance of its self-
19821
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interests advanced by the state. 43 Having reached that point, however, it did
not in fact weigh the two sets of interests. Instead, it announced that the first
amendment prohibited such balancing, however reasonable or well-inten-
tioned. It laid down a rule that a state simply may not, consistently with the
first amendment, completely suppress truthful and nonmisleading advertising
of lawful products on the ground that allowing the information to be con-
veyed to the public would have a harmful effect on them or on the adver-
tisers; 44 this decision, the Court explained, was one that "the First Amend-
ment makes for us."' 45 Such a restriction would be "highly paternalistic"
and inconsistent with traditional first amendment principles and with the
notion that "people will perceive their own best interests if only they are well
enough informed." ' 46  Thus, even though the Virginia Board Court structured
its opinion in a manner suggesting that it would engage in balancing, it
actually adopted a per se approach.47
Subsequent Court decisions paid lip service to balancing, but recognized
that Virginia Board, if taken seriously, granted close to complete first amend-
ment protection to commercial speech. In Linmark Associates v. Township of
governing function."), with The Supreme Court, 1979 Term, supra note 9, at 166 ("Since
commercial messages necessarily contain social and political implications, they possess the same
potential as other forms of speech to challenge those in political power and constitute a portion of
the public dialogue on policy issues." (footnote omitted)).
Finally, the Court suggested that commercial speech should be protected because no work-
able line could be drawn protecting only advertising with high public interest content and no
other. Any advertiser could insert a public interest element into his message. 425 U.S. at 764-65.
Commentators have argued, however, that the line-drawing problem is not in practice a serious
one, in any case not serious enough to justify abandoning the distinction entirely. T. Emerson,
Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment 105 n.46 (1966); Jackson & Jeffries, supra note
9, at 19-20. See also Judge Frank's opinion dissenting from the Second Circuit decision in
Chrestensen v. Valentine:
We should not be disturbed because, in the future, cases may arise where there will
be some difficulty in ascertaining the primary purpose in distributing a handbill, and,
because, when such cases arise, the courts may not be able to stop at locating merely the
north and south poles of the subject matter, but may be required to do a more precise
job of legal map-making and to fix a definite equatorial line. Where to draw such lines
"is the question in pretty much everything worth arguing in the law," Mr. Justice
Holmes often noted.
122 F.2d 511, 520 (2d Cir. 1941) (quoting Irwin v. Gavit, 268 U.S. 161, 168 (1925)), rev'd, 316
U.S. 52 (1942).
43. The Court listed maintenance of professionalism, of high standards of quality, and of
stable pharmacist-customer relationships. 425 U.S. at 766-70.
44. Id. at 769-70, 773. The argument was less emphatically foreshadowed in Bigelow. There,
the Court stated merely that a state interest in "shielding its citizens from information" about
services available in other states "was entitled to little, if any, weight." Bigelow v. Virginia, 421
U.S. 809, 827-28 (1975).
45. 425 U.S. at 770.
46. Id. Justice Rehnquist has questioned whether people will indeed act in their own long-run
best interests merely because more information is made available to them. He suggests that often
the short-run interests of individuals may not coincide with the long-run interests of society, that
people may well pursue the former rather than the latter, and that "this is a consideration that the
government may properly take into account." Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv.
Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 593 n.5 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
47. Virginia Board did not foreclose "mere time, place, and manner" restrictions on speech.
Such restrictions in this context must be content-neutral, must serve a significant government
interest, and must leave open ample alternate channels for communication. 425 U.S. at 771.
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Willingboro,4" for example, the Court struck down a town ordinance banning
"For Sale" signs on all but model homes, a regulation aimed at forestalling
panic selling in a racially changing community. The Court quoted the lan-
guage of Bigelow calling for a "weighing" of interests, 49 but found that even
the "vital" goal advanced by the town in Linmark simply could not be
achieved, consistently with the first amendment, by restricting the free flow of
truthful information.5 0 The Court went on, in Carey v. Population Services
International,5' to strike down a ban on the advertisement of contraceptives,5 2
and in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona,53 to strike down a ban on truthful
newspaper advertising of the availability and terms of routine legal services.5 4
The Court in Bates suggested that since the challenged rule served to inhibit
the free flow of commercial information and kept the public in ignorance, its
unconstitutionality flowed a fortiori from the decision in Virginia Board.55 By
1978, unqualified protection for truthful and nonmisleading commercial
speech seemed a reasonably settled matter.5
C. The Retreat from Protection
In the cases following Bates, the Court signalled a retreat from its protec-
tion of commercial speech. In Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Association,57 the
Court, emphasizing the "limited measure of protection" afforded commercial
speech, 58 held that entire classes of commercial speech, necessarily including
some harmless speech, could be prohibited where allowing the speech would
be likely to result in some deception or overreaching because of difficulties in
policing.5 9
48. 431 U.S. 85 (1977).
49. Id. at 91.
50. Id. at 94-97.
51. 431 U.S. 678, 700-02 (1977).
52. The Carey holding was, however, based at least in part on the finding that the sale of
contraceptives had independent constitutional protection. 431 U.S. at 687-88, 700-01.
53. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
54. Id. at 384.
55. Id. at 365.
56. For a 1978 statement of the law, see L. Tribe, supra note 17, at 663 n.51 ("Truthful
statements which are neither misleading nor obscene are protected by the first amendment even
though made for a commercial purpose.").
57. 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
58. Id. at 456.
59. Id. at 464-67. There had been some fears after Virginia Board that the ability of federal
agencies such as the FDA and FTC to impose blanket prophylactic rules prohibiting various
claims or phrases would be taken away, and that only closely drawn standards would be accept-
able. See Reich, Preventing Deception in Commercial Speech, 54 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 775, 775-79
(1979); Comment, supra note 28, at 808 n.58; Note, Yes, FTC, There is a Virginia: The Impact of
Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc. on the Federal
Trade Commission's Regulation of Misleading Advertising, 57 B.U. L. Rev. 833, 850 (1977)
(proposing the standard of "advertising that a reasonable person could interpret as making a false
assertion"). Such limited regulation, though, seemed inadequate. See Cox, supra note 6, at 32.
Ohralik and Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1 (1979), freed the regulators of the fear that they
might be held to so strict a standard. See, e.g., United States v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, Inc., 662
F.2d 955, 965 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S.Ct. 1253 (1982); Jay Norris, Inc. v. FTC, 598
F.2d 1244, 1252 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 980 (1979). See generally Federal Trade
Commission Act §§ 5, 12, 15, 15 U.S.C. §§ 45, 52, 55 (1976).
1982]
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After its approval in Ohralik of broad prophylactic restrictions reaching
even harmless speech, the Court in Friedman v. Rogers 0 sharply expanded
the definition of potentially harmful speech. There, the Court upheld a statute
banning any use of trade names by optometric offices, on the ground that
"there is a significant possibility that trade names will be used to mislead the
public."' t The Court also suggested that trade names might be legitimately
banned because large-scale commercial optometric practice constitutes "con-
duct the State rationally may wish to discourage while not prohibiting...
altogether," and the prohibition of trade names was a means toward that
end. 62 The suggestion marked a distinct retreat from the Virginia Board and
Linmark rejections of "paternalism," 6 3 implying that the state can in fact
protect its citizens by keeping information from them. 64
The Friedman holding set the stage for the Court's explicit statement in
Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service CommissionOs that the
state may indeed, using narrowly drawn restrictions, suppress commercial
speech solely in order to dampen demand for a legitimate product. In Central
Hudson, the Court considered a New York Public Service Commission rule
prohibiting electrical utilities subject to its jurisdiction from running advertise-
ments that promoted or stimulated electricity consumption.66 Although the
60. 440 U.S. 1 (1979).
61. Id. at 12-13. The challenged Texas statute prohibited the practice of optometry under a
trade name, requiring that optometric offices be identified only by the names of the optometrists
practicing there. Its effect was to leave intact the "professional" practice of optometry in Texas,
but to eliminate the "commercial" practice, in which an organization would franchise out
optometric offices around the state under a single name, operating on a high-volume, low-cost
basis.
The case was treated as one involving commercial speech, on the ground that trade names
may identify the good or service they represent and convey information about the type, price, and
quality of that good or service, and as such are used as part of a proposal of a commercial
transaction. Id. at 11. The Court reasoned that trade names have no intrinsic meaning but acquire
"ill-defined associations" in the minds of the public with price and quality information, that these
associations can be "manipulated" by the users of the trade names, and that as a result the use of
trade names is conducive to deception and may be prohibited. Id. at 12-13. The standard laid
down seems a tremendously broad definition of what constitutes misleading speech; if trade
names under this analysis can be found to be misleading, it is hard to imagine what could not be.
See Cox, supra note 6, at 33.
62. 440 U.S. at 13.
63. The Court in dictum resurrected the concept of ad hoc balancing in commercial speech
adjudication, characterizing Virginia Board as a case where the important state interest in
pharmacists' professionalism was outweighed by the first amendment interests in the information
conveyed. Id. at 8-9.
64. One commentator has suggested that the key to the Court's decision in Friedman is "the
futility of attempting to maintain a general constitutional distinction between commercial adver-
tising and other commercial activity." Given that Texas could easily have achieved its goal
through a direct prohibition of commercial optometric practice rather than a prohibition of its
advertising, the Court was unwilling to hold that one means was legitimate and the other not.
Cox, supra note 6, at 33.
65. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
66. The Public Service Commission (PSC) maintained that such advertising was contrary to
the national policy of conserving energy. It worried that the advertising would send "misleading
signals" to the public at a time when energy conservation was called for. 447 U.S. at 558-60. Of
the Court, only Justice Rehnquist gave any weight to the fact that the speaker in this case was a
public utility, a state-created monopoly. He suggested that such an entity is, for first amendment
purposes, "far closer to a state-controlled enterprise than is an ordinary corporation," and is
subject to "a special duty to conform its conduct to the [PSC's] conception of the public
interest." 447 U.S. at 587-88 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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Court struck down the specific regulation at issue as overly broad,67 it en-
dorsed such regulations of nonmisleading speech generally. The Court an-
nounced that nonmisleading commercial speech concerning lawful activity
may constitutionally be subjected to regulation directly advancing a substan-
tial state interest, so long as the regulation is no more extensive than necessary
to serve that interest.68 The Court drew no distinction between regulations
directly aimed at the content of the speech, and those concerned only with the
manner of its exercise. 69  In so doing, it rejected the absolute rule of Lin-
mark,70 and legitimized a degree of regulation of nonmisleading commercial
speech that would be an anathema in any other area 71 of first amendment
jurisprudence. 72
The Court's requirement that commercial speech regulation be no more
extensive than necessary, however, a "least restrictive means" standard, can
in the discretion of the Court be made impossible to meet. One can always
find, in challenging a regulation, a slightly less "drastic" or "restrictive"
alternative. 73  The Court thus gave with one hand and took away with the
other; while commercial speech restrictions may have little trouble surviving
the substantial-state-interest test, they are subject as well to a least-restrictive-
means test that the Court has the power either to emphasize or to ignore.
74
67. The Court found that "[i]n the absence of authoritative findings to the contrary, we
must credit as within the realm of possibility" the claim that some advertising of electric services
might not detract from the cause of energy conservation. 447 U.S. at 570. The finding has been
characterized as a striking substitution of judicial opinion for state regulatory authority. Cox,
supra note 6, at 35.
68. 447 U.S. at 564, 566.
69. Professor Tribe would treat restrictions in the first category as "presumptively at odds
with the first amendment," while subjecting restrictions in the second category only to a balanc-
ing test. L. Tribe, supra note 17, at 580-81. The Court's rule subjects restrictions in both
categories to the same test, and has in fact been applied by the lower courts to restrictions in both
categories. See infra text accompanying notes 75-76.
70. Justice Blackmun, concurring in Central Hudson, saw the Court's test as an appropriate
one for "time, place, and manner" restrictions, but asserted that Linmark precluded suppression,
except pursuant to a strict standard of review, where the state's goal was to suppress truthful,
nondeceptive information in order to manipulate private economic decisions. 447 U.S. at 573-78.
71. Sexually explicit speech might be an exception. See generally Young v. American Mini
Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976); New York State Liquor Auth. v. Bellanca, 452 U.S. 714 (1981)
(per curiam).
72. Justice Rehnquist, dissenting, complained that the new rule accords commercial speech a
level of protection that is "virtually indistinguishable from that of noncommercial speech," 447
U.S. at 591, but he was surely wrong in that assessment. A restriction on political speech aimed
directly at suppressing the information and ideas conveyed by that speech could not be justified
without some showing of compelling necessity, or clear and present danger. Consolidated Edison
Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 535-40 (1980); First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S.
765, 786 (1978); Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S.
357, 373 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring); L. Tribe, supra note 17, at 582.
73. Illinois State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 188-89 (1979)
(Blackmun, J., concurring), quoted in Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 600 (Rehnquist, J., dissent-
ing).
74. One year after Central Hudson, the Court handed down a decision in Metromedia, Inc.
v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981), in which it ignored the question of least restrictive
means. The Court there considered a challenge to a San Diego billboard ordinance prohibiting all
"outdoor advertising display signs" except for on-site signs (those identifying the premises on
which they are placed, or advertising goods and services sold there) and others described in
narrow exceptions. Id. at 493-94. The plurality, though striking down the ordinance, held it
constitutional as applied to commercial speech only. It deferred to the city's judgment as "not
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The Court has thus created a shifting rule of law that may lead to little
more than ad hoc adjudication. The lower courts, in assessing challenges to
"time, place, and manner" restrictions on nonmisleading commercial speech,
have tended to apply Central Hudson and uphold the restriction; 7 5 in assess-
ing challenges to restrictions on content they have tended to strike down the
restriction, sometimes citing Central Hudson and sometimes ignoring it en-
tirely. 76  In so doing, they have in practice drawn the distinction that the
Court refused to draw. Such application of a Supreme Court rule, however, is
healthy neither for the bar nor for the advertisers being regulated. 77
II. PROTECTED INTERESTS AND UNDERLYING VALUES
The first amendment protects three distinct interests: those of the
speaker, the listener, and the communications process itself.78 Each interest
manifestly unreasonable," id. at 509, and dismissed in a single short paragraph the argument that
there existed means less restrictive than a total ban on off-site commercial billboards of achieving
the city's traffic safety goal. Id. at 508.
The plurality went on to reason that the presence of the on-site exception meant that the
ordinance afforded a greater degree of protection to commercial than to noncommercial speech,
and that this was constitutionally impermissible, since commercial speech must be granted less
protection than noncommercial speech, rather than more. Id. at 513. It further found that the
narrow exceptions for time-of-day signs and the like violated the principle of content-neutrality,
and that the ordinance must fall on that ground as well.
75. See, e.g., Ad. World, Inc. v. Township of Doylestown, 510 F. Supp. 851 (E.D. Pa.
1981), cert. denied, 50 U.S.L.W. 3916 (U.S. May 17, 1982); May v. Colorado, 636 P.2d 672
(Colo. 1981). But see In re Greene, 54 N.Y.2d 118, 126-27, 429 N.E.2d 390, 394, 444 N.Y.S.2d
883, 887 (1981), cert. denied, 50 U.S.L.W. 3766 (U.S. Mar. 23, 1982), implying that the Central
Hudson four-part analysis is not necessary unless the regulation is found to be content-based.
76. See, e.g., Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 526 F. Supp. 823 (D.D.C. 1981), prob.juris. noted, 50 U.S.L.W. 3915 (U.S. May 17, 1982) (No. 81-1590); Oklahoma Telecasters Ass'n
v. Crisp, No. Civ-81-439-W, slip op. (W.D. Okla. Feb. 10, 1982) (available Apr. 26, 1982 on
LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file); Illinois Ass'n of Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 516 F. Supp.
1067 (N.D. Il. 1981) (Central Hudson available but nowhere cited); Equifax Services v. Cohen,
420 A.2d 189 (Me. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 916 (1981).
77. The Court most recently spoke to questions of commercial speech in In re R.M.J., 102 S.
Ct. 929 (1982). It there reversed a state bar association disciplinary action punishing an attorney
for placing advertisements in which he listed the jurisdictions in which he was licensed to practice,
stated that he was a member of the Supreme Court bar, and deviated from state-prescribed
language in describing his areas of practice, as well as for mailing out cards announcing the
opening of his office to the general public. The Court held that in the absence of any lower court
finding that the attorney's actions were inherently or in fact misleading, and in the absence of any
suggestion that the restrictions served other substantial state interests, the restrictions could not
stand. Id. at 939.
Litigation in the commercial speech area is continuing. See, e.g., Bolger v. Youngs Drug
Prods. Corp., 526 F. Supp. 823 (D.D.C. 1981) (statute banning unsolicited advertisements for
contraceptives violates first amendment), prob. juris. noted, 50 U.S.L.W. 3915 (U.S. May 17,
1982) (No. 81-1590); Princess Sea Indus. v. Nevada, 635 P. 2d 281 (Nev. 1981) (state may
constitutionally restrict advertising of brothels even in counties where prostitution is legal), cert.
denied, 50 U.S.L.W. 3838 (U.S. Apr. 20, 1982).
78. Cf. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 775 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("[The
First Amendment protects a process, . . . and the right to speak and hear ... are inextricably part
of that process. The freedom to speak and the freedom to hear are inseparable; they are two sides
of the same coin. But the coin itself is the process of thought and discussion.").
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reflects an aspect of communication that is crucial if there is to be communi-
cation at all-there can hardly be speech without a speaker; that speaker's
speech is pointless without one to hear and appreciate it; and it is unavailing to
have willing speakers and eager listeners if the process of communication itself
is clogged.
Underlying the protection of any expression are four basic values: politi-
cal self-government, self-realization through expression, discovery of truth,
and individual growth through perception. Combined, the interests and the
values provide a framework for first amendment analysis: 79 the interests
determining the scope of permissible restrictions on protected speech, and the
values determining"0 what sorts of speech are to be protected. 8'
79. The values play a crucial role in first amendment analysis because the first amendment
cannot be read to protect "speech" defined in entirely nonfunctional terms. The existence,
without constitutional controversy, of statutes criminalizing conspiracy, solicitation of crime,
perjury, espionage, and the like suffice to prove this. Rather, only speech implementing basic first
amendment values is speech that deserves protection. See Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 49
& n.10 (1961); T. Emerson, supra note 42, at 430-31; Jackson & Jeffries, supra note 9, at 8-9.
In the area of commercial speech, Professors Jackson and Jeffries have explicitly undertaken
this sort of analysis. See Jackson & Jeffries, supra note 9, at 1-25; see also Chrestensen v.
Valentine, 122 F.2d 511, 525 (2d Cir. 1941) (Frank, J., dissenting) (Protecting commercial speech
"would be to 'thingify' the words 'free speech' and 'free expression', and to become forgetful of
the vital ideas ... for which they stand."). But see L. Tribe, supra note 17, at 576:
[F]reedom of speech [should not] be regarded only as a means to some further end....
[It is] in part also an end in itself, an expression of the sort of persons we wish to be....
No adequate conception of so basic an element of our fundamental law ... can be
developed in purely instrumental or "purposive" terms.
Cf. CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 145 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring) ("When
we lose sight of the First Amendment itself, and march forth in blind pursuit of its 'values,' " we
run the risk of diluting essential protections.).
Judge (then Professor) Bork, while recognizing that a number of values could arguably be
found to underlie the amendment, would draw what he considers to be the most clear-cut and
workable line at the "outer limits of political speech." Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First
Amendment Problems, 47 Ind. L.J. 1, 27-28 (1971). Professor Schauer would categorize value-
oriented first amendment analysis as exhibiting a "defining in" rather than a "defining out"
perspective. Schauer, Categories and the First Amendment: A Play in Three Acts, 34 Vand. L.
Rev. 265, 281-82 (1981). For an example of a "defining out" approach, see Schiro, supra note 17,
at 93.
80. The values are to some degree overlapping and amorphous; in general more than one
value is implicated by any given example of speech. This makes it difficult to discover direct
support in the cases for a theory based on reasoning from underlying values. Where speech
advances both value A and value B, one cannot tell for sure whether one of the values might not
be wholly irrelevant, and the other the basis for protection. Even with this limitation, however, a
value-based structure provides a useful analytical framework on which to build first amendment
analysis.
81. It seems safe to say that advertising was not speech specifically intended to be protected
by the Framers. See Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 404 (1977) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting in relevant part). It appears, though, that the Framers in fact had no coherent theory of
free speech, and paid little attention to the issue. See L. Levy, Legacy of Suppression: Freedom of
Speech and Press in Early American History (1960); Bork, supra note 79, at 22. Just as no specific
meanings were intended, it appears likely that virtually no particular meanings were foreclosed-
the very vagueness of the text was intended to delegate to future generations the task of develop-
ing an exact meaning. See BeVier, The First Amendment and Political Speech: An Inquiry Into
the Substance and Limits of Principle, 30 Stan. L. Rev. 299, 307 (1978).
1982]
COLUMBIA LA W REVIEW
A. Interests Protected
1. Speaker Interests. The Supreme Court has traditionally approached
first amendment analysis by focusing on the interests of the speaker.82 Where
the first amendment is viewed as guaranteeing a constitutional right to free
expression, the speaker is the actor naturally associated with that right.8 For
example, where speech serves to create unrest and dispute,84 it is the speaker
who is asserting a right to provoke and distress others. Similar emphasis on
the speaker interest is apparent, for example, in Professor Baker's assertion
that speech is protected to the degree that it is "a manifestation of individual
freedom and choice." 8 5
First amendment analysis focusing on the speaker interest yields two
important results. First, no considerations of redundancy can apply-protec-
tion for speech can never be denied on the ground that the same communica-
tion is being made, or has been made, equally well by someone else. 80
Especially where the protection given to the speaker is based on his own self-
realization, achieved through his speech, protection cannot be diminished
because some other speaker is conveying the same ideas and information.
Focusing only on the speaker's personal interests in speaking, first amend-
ment analysis must proceed without regard to the speech of others.
Second, in considering speech implicating the speaker interest, the proper
standard is a subjective one, focusing on the mind of the speaker. The
speaker's motivation is crucial. Chrestensen, where the Court upheld an
ordinance banning the distribution of advertising matter on the ground that
an advertiser's motivation is purely commerical, can thus be explained as a
case where the speaker's improper motivation negated any speaker interests
that the advertiser might have asserted. The Chrestensen Court erred, though,
in assuming that no further inquiry into other protected interests was neces-
82. See Emerson, supra note 30, at 464: "[T]he main thrust of the system of freedom of
expression has always been to secure the right to communicate," since if that is secured then
protection of other interests will normally follow.
83.
The constitutional right of free expression [is designed to put] the decision as to
what views shall be voiced largely into the hands of each of us ... in the belief that no
other approach would comport with the premise of individual dignity and choice upon
which our political system rests.
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971).
84. See Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949).
85. Baker, Commercial Speech: A Problem in the Theory of Freedom, 62 Iowa L. Rev. 1, 3
(1976). See also Z. Chafee, Free Speech in the United States 33 (1941) (The first amendment
protects "the need of many men to express their opinions on matters vital to them if life is to be
worth living."); infra notes 127-30 and accompanying text. But see Meiklejohn, The First
Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 Sup. Ct. Rev. 245, 255 ("The First Amendment does not protect
a 'freedom to speak.' It protects the freedom of those activities of thought and communication by
which we 'govern'. . . ."), quoted in Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610, 627 n.3 (1976)
(Brennan, J., concurring).
86. See L. Tribe, supra note 17, at 603-04. Contrast the attitude of Professor Meiklejohn,
who did not recognize speaker interests and argued that "[w]hat is essential is not that everyone
shall speak, but that everything worth saying shall be said." A. Meiklejohn, supra note 38, at 25.
In the area of broadcast regulation, where speaker interests do not control, a redundancy
principle has been implicitly adopted. Compare Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367
(1969), with Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1976).
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sary. While protection of speaker interests is often sufficient to safeguard
threatened first amendment rights,8 7 it is, without more, inadequate to reflect
the full spectrum of values" underlying the first amendment.
2. Listener Interests. The existence of a protected listener interest seems
well established, although the interest has received comparatively little atten-
tion in the case law. The existence of a listener interest was first asserted by the
Court in dictum; 9 it first became the basis for Court holdings in cases
extending protection to political discussion where the speaker could assert no
first amendment right himself. Thus, in Lamont v. Postmaster General,90 the
Court struck down a statute burdening the receipt of "communist political
propaganda" from abroad; 9' in Kleindienst v. Mandel,92 the Court found that
first amendment interests were infringed by a Justice Department refusal to
admit a nonresident alien invited to participate in political colloquia and
debates.93 In both these cases, in which the foreign speaker could assert no
right to disseminate his speech in this country, 94 the Court emphasized the
existence of a first amendment interest belonging to the recipient of the
speech, 5 a "right to 'receive information and ideas.' "96
The Court has asserted listener interests in other cases as well, although
some of these instances are arguably more concerned with privacy than with
expression. For example, in Stanley v. Georgia,97 the Court invoked a listener
87. See supra note 82.
88. See infra text accompanying notes 118-66.
89. In some cases, the Court found a listener interest where the speech would in any case be
protected because of speaker interests. See Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 533-34 (1945) (the
right to hear labor speech is part of, and necessary to, the right of labor assembly); Martin v. City
of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943) (the "right to receive" literature is a first amendment right;
free exercise also implicated); see also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965) ("the
right to receive, the right to read" protected by the first amendment); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310
U.S. 88, 102 (1940) (emphasizing "the public need for information and education with respect to
the significant issues of the times").
90. 381 U.S. 301 (1965).
91. Lamont can be read as a decision imposing limits upon the government's power to snoop
through the mails, perhaps foreshadowing later privacy doctrines. This element, strongly present
in Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974), discussed infra notes 99-102 and accompanying
text, was probably less important here, since the statute in Lamont was limited to unsealed mail.
381 U.S. at 302.
92. 408 U.S. 753 (1972).
93. Mandel, a Belgian journalist, had been denied an entry visa under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(a)(28)(D) (1976), banning from the United States "[a]liens ... who advocate the eco-
nomic, international, and governmental doctrines of world communism." Id. at 755. The Court,
after acknowledging the first amendment rights of professors who sought to listen to Mandel,
held the exclusion proper in light of Congress's plenary powers to regulate alien affairs.
Justice Marshall, arguing for Mandel's admission, relied in part on "appellees' personal
rights both to hear Mandel's views and to develop and articulate their own views through
interaction with Mandel." 408 U.S. at 776 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
94. See Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 781-85 (1950).
95. Justice Brennan, concurring in Lamont, emphasized that "[tlhe dissemination of ideas
can accomplish nothing if otherwise willing addressees are not free to receive and consider them."
381 U.S. at 308. According to Justice Brennan, a right to hear flows necessarily from a right to
speak-speakers are nothing without listeners. The argument, accepted by the plurality in Board
of Educ., Island Trees Union Free School Dist. v. Pico, 50 U.S.L.W. 4831, 4835 (U.S. June 24,
1982), but correctly rejected by Justice Rehnquist in dissent, id. at 4847, is flawed. Given that the
speaker in Lamont had no right to speak, it was useless to say that a right to speak will generate
corresponding rights to hear. Any listener interest must have had an independent basis.
96. Mandel, 408 U.S. at 762.
97. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
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interest in order to constitutionalize a right to private possession of obscene
materials, 8 and in Procunier v. Martinez,"9 it struck down restrictions on
letter writing by prison inmates' 00 without reaching the question of the in-
mates' own first amendment rights.' 0'
By 1976, the Court in Virginia Board could describe the existence of a
general right to receive information and ideas from a willing speaker as
"clear,"' 0 2 although the Court may have claimed to find somewhat more
clarity in the cases than was apparent. Recently, it has invoked the interest
without hesitation. 0 3
Where speech implicates only listener interests, the first amendment pro-
vides a different sort of protection than where speaker interests are impli-
cated. First, since the emphasis is on what reaches the listener, "redundant"
speech is not protected. If a particular idea will reach the same audience even
though an individual speaker is gagged, there is nothing in the listener interest
to preclude such restraint. 0 4  Similarly, a mode of communication may be
blocked if the speech is likely to reach the listener in some other form. 0 5
98. The Court cited a "right to receive information and ideas." Id. at 564. It was protecting
no speaker interest in the dissemination of obscene material, since no such interest exists.
Similarly, it was protecting no "marketplace" interest, because obscene material has been held
not to contribute to the marketplace of ideas. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957). Thus, if
the Court was protecting any first amendment interest at all, it was protecting the recipient's
interests. The Court, however, based its holding in part on privacy interests, and it seems likely
that the decision rested largely on its privacy leg and rather less on its right-to-receive leg. See Roe
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973) (Stanley located the "roots" of a right of personal privacy in
the first amendment). But see Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 609 (1977) (Stewart, J., concurring)
(Stanley essentially concerned not with privacy but with a "right to read").
99. 416 U.S. 396 (1974).
100. At stake were California prison rules prohibiting inmates from writing letters in which
they "unduly complain" or "magnify grievances," which express "inflammatory" beliefs, or
which "pertain to criminal activity; are lewd, obscene, and defamatory; contain foreign matter,
or are otherwise inappropriate." Id. at 399-400.
101. The Court stated that it need not "deal ... with difficult questions of the so-called
'right to hear,' " id. at 409, but based its holding in part on the argument that "[t]he wife of a
prison inmate who is not permitted to read all that her husband wanted to say to her has suffered
an abridgment of her interest in communicating with him." Id. In addition, the Court hinted that
it was relying on process interests, see infra text accompanying note 111.
It seems likely that some members of the Court may have considered privacy interests at stake
here, though none were asserted.
102. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748, 756 (1976).
Justice Rehnquist, in dissent, argued that a right to receive should only be found where the
would-be recipients could not reasonably receive the information through some other means. Id.
at 782. General listener-interest analysis dictates that no right to receive a specific communication
should be found unless acknowledging such a right will increase the degree to which the ideas or
information in question will get through to the listeners, see text following this note; see also
Board of Educ., Island Trees Union Free School Dist. v. Pico, 50 U.S.L.W. 4831, 4847 (U.S.
June 24, 1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Recognition of a listener's right to receive drug price
advertising, however, will increase the degree to which the information gets through when
compared to consumers' abilities to call up all local drugstores and obtain the information
themselves.
103. See Board of Educ., Island Trees Union Free School Dist. v. Pico, 50 U.S.L.W. 4831
(U.S. June 24, 1982); First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 781-83 (1978).
104. See A. Meiklejohn, supra note 38.
105. Cf. generally Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 62 (1976), where the
Court found, and emphasized, that a Detroit ordinance restricting adult theatres still left enough
sites for adult theatres to accommodate all patrons. Professor Tribe has argued that the theatres
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Second, the motivation and identity of the speaker are irrelevant. From the
point of view of the listener, the value of the speech lies only in its content.
10 6
3. The Process Interest. In addition to speaker and listener interests,
several Supreme Court opinions manifest an independent interest in maintain-
ing the structure that permits communication. Protection of the communica-
tions process can be most readily seen in the Court's broadcast regulation
cases, notably Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,10 7 in which the Court
upheld the fairness doctrine against first amendment challenge. 08 The
Court's decision in Red Lion cannot be satisfactorily explained by the pres-
ence of either speaker interests 10 9 or listener interests; 110 rather, the focus is on
protecting the integrity of the medium, in establishing a working marketplace
of ideas in the radio spectrum. Similar protection for another concrete process
of communication may be found in Procunier, where the Court at one point
purported to rely not on listener interests as such, but on the fact that the
government had interfered with the process of communication through the
mails, "a particular means of communication in which the interests of both
parties are inextricably meshed." "'
The Court, however, has expanded the scope of the process interest
beyond the protection of specific, concrete vehicles for communication. It has
recognized the importance of the interest in protecting the communications
process in its broadest sense, in the form of the general marketplace of ideas.
Thus, in Mandel, where the issue was admission of a journalist into the
country to participate in a series of colloquia and debates,1 2 Justice Mar-
shall's dissenting opinion described the Court as correctly finding that a
"general public interest" in "the process of thought and discussion" had been
infringed, an interest distinct from that of a speaker or a listener." 3
were granted a lower standard of protection in Young because the Court recognized no speaker
interest, only a "generalized 'right to know' of the viewing public." L. Tribe, supra note 17, at
676-77. But see Schad v. Borough of Mt. Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981) (zoning ordinance
prohibiting live entertainment in any form not saved by the fact that entertainment is available in
nearby areas).
106. See First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777 (1978). The Court there made it
plain, see id. at 782 n.18, that it sought to protect listener interests.
107. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
108. The Court held that because of the limited number of frequencies available for public
broadcasting, "it is idle to posit an unabridgeable First Amendment right to broadcast." Id. at
388. Since the broadcast licensee may have no more "right" to a license than a nonlicensee, the
government may require the broadcaster to act as a "proxy or fiduciary" to present community
views and voices that would not otherwise enjoy access to the electronic media. Id. at 389.
The Court went beyond that, however, to find that the first amendment affirmatively
mandates the fairness doctrine. Citing "the right of the public," it emphasized that "[i]t is the
purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth
will ultimately prevail, rather than to countenance monopolization of that market." Id. at 390.
109. The Court was not protecting the rights of outside speakers, because the thrust of the
fairness doctrine is to award a reasonable amount of broadcast time to opposing viewpoints rather
than to opposing speakers. Id. at 391. Thus, depending on circumstances, a particular speaker
may be able to assert no first amendment broadcast right at all.
110. Although the Court spoke of "the right of the viewers and listeners" as paramount to
"the right of the broadcasters," id. at 390, that right alone would not justify placing an
affirmative obligation on broadcasters to disseminate speech with which they disagree.
111. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 409 (1974). For discussion of Procunier, see supra
notes 99-101 and accompanying text; infra note 159.
112. See supra notes 92-93 and accompanying text.
113. 408 U.S. 753, 775-76 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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The process interest, like the listener interest, yields protection that is
limited in scope. Redundant speakers need not be protected; if an idea is well-
represented in the marketplace, the right of other speakers to champion it
need not be protected. 1 4  Further, there is a tendency under the process
interest to deny protection to marginal listeners, i.e., those listeners whose
contribution to the communications marketplace of ideas is seen to be out-
weighed by the burden on the process of allowing them a right to receive." 5
Finally, the motivation and identity of the speaker are unimportant: 116 neither
has any effect on the value of the speech in the marketplace.1 7
B. Values Promoted
1. Political Self-Government. An important purpose of the first amend-
ment is to protect the free discussion of political and governmental affairs." 8
Because political speech "is more than self-expression; it is the essence of self-
government," "19 the Supreme Court has frequently identified self-government
as the central social value advanced by the first amendment." 0
114. See A. Meiklejohn, supra note 38, at 25:
The First Amendment ... does not require that, on every occasion, every citizen
shall take part in public debate. Nor can it even give assurance that everyone shall have
the opportunity to do so. If, for example, at a town meeting, twenty like-minded citizens
have become a "party," and if one of them has read to the meeting an argument which
they have all approved, it would be ludicrously out of order for each of the others to
insist on reading it again.
115. In Gottfried v. FCC, 655 F.2d 297 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 998 (1982)
(No. 81-799), hearing-impaired plaintiffs, asserting a first amendment right of access to program-
ming over the public airwaves, sued for a blanket requirement of television closed-captioning.
Judge 1. Skelly Wright answered that "[e]ven if the First Amendment entitles the hearing
impaired to have access to some minimum of programming over the airwaves, however, we could
not accept that it requires all stations to make their programming accessible to all deaf persons all
of the time." Id. at 311 n.54. Judge Wright cited for that proposition a case upholding the denial
of broadcast access to speakers, CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 111 (1973). The
theoretical basis for denying broadcast access to speakers, however, cannot automatically be
extended to affect the broadcast rights of listeners. The former rests strongly on the limited
availability of broadcast frequencies, see Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367(1969), a factor which does not apply here.
116. See First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777, 783 (1978).
117. Efforts to extend the idea that "regulation of the communications market [may]
sometimes facilitate ... the exchange of information [and] ideas," Metromedia, Inc. v. City of
San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 548 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting), to regulation of political speech
have been largely unsuccessful. See, e.g., Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241(1974) (striking down statute imposing obligation on newspaper to give political candidates "right
of reply").
Justice White has championed the approach, claiming that regulation of speakers may be
necessary to protect the marketplace. Dissenting in First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765(1978), he argued that the vast economic power of corporations, unrelated to the strength of the
convictions of individual shareholders or officers, "may be viewed as seriously threatening the
role of the First Amendment as a guarantor of a free marketplace of ideas," id. at 810. The
Court, however, has rejected this approach. It has held that "the concept that government may
restrict the speech of some elements of society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is
wholly foreign to the first amendment," except in the context of broadcast regulation. Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1976).
118. Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966).
119. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964).
120. See First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 771, 776-77 (1978); Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. 1, 14 (1976); Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 272 (1971); Grosjean v. American
Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936); see also New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266(1964).
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The political self-government value was the one most clearly in the minds
of the Framers.1 2 1 Madison wrote of the necessity of "popular information
[and] the means of acquiring it" if a popular government was to survive; "a
people who mean to be their own Governors, must arm themselves with the
power which knowledge gives." 2 2 Political speech is said to ensure that the
government is intelligently run, 2 3 that the "systematic integrity of our consti-
tutional scheme of self-government" is preserved 24 and that basic notions of
freedom are upheld. 25
Speech promoting the self-government value may advance speaker, lis-
tener, and process interests. The value implicates speaker interests because it
safeguards the citizen's political right to political expression. Therefore,
speech advancing the self-government value must be protected regardless of
whether it repeats what others have said. In addition, the value implicates
listener interests, through its goals of fostering the growth of the faculties
equipping the individual to live as a citizen of a democratic state and further-
ing the citizen's ability to make informed choices when called upon to decide
political issues. Finally, the value draws in the process interest, for robust
political discussions and informed political choices are impossible without a
protected marketplace in which different ideas can vie for acceptance.
26
2. Self-Expression. A second basic value underlying the first amendment
is that of individual self-fulfillment through expression.2 7 As argued by
Professor Thomas Emerson,128 a basic premise of Western thought is that the
goal of each individual should be the full realization of his character and
potential as a human being. The formation of the individual's own beliefs and
opinions is a crucial part of the development of his own personality, and
expression is a basic element in "the development of ideas, . . . mental
121. See Note, The Right to Know in First Amendment Analysis, 57 Tex. L. Rev. 505,
506-07 (1979).
122. Letter from James Madison to W.T. Barry (August 4, 1822), reprinted in Note, supra
note 121, at 506.
Most contemporary colonial commentators saw freedom of speech as amounting to no more
than freedom of press and petition, and thus encompassing little non-political speech. See Annals
of Cong. 738 (1789); L. Levy, supra note 81, at 174.
123. See A. Meiklejohn, supra note 38, at 26 ("Just so far as, at any point, the citizens who
are to decide an issue are denied acquaintance with information or opinion or doubt or disbelief
or criticism which is relevant to that issue, just so far the result must be ill-considered, ill-balanced
planning for the general good.").
124. Jackson & Jeffries, supra note 4, at 11.
125. The individual denied the opportunity to participate in his own government cannot be
said to be free. See J.-J. Rousseau, The Social Contract 49-68 (Penguin ed. 1968).
126. The Court has, however, declined to apply to political speech the sort of regulation of
the communications process that the marketplace metaphor is seen to mandate in the broadcast
area. See supra note 117.
127. The idea in less elaborate form is an old one: Milton described licensing of the press as
"the greatest displeasure and indignity to a free and knowing spirit that can be put upon him."
J. Milton, Areopagitica, in Prose Writings 21 (Everyman's Library ed. 1927).
128. See generally T. Emerson, supra note 42; T. Emerson, The System of Freedom of
Expression (1970) [hereinafter cited as T. Emerson, The System]; Emerson, supra note 30;
Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 Yale L.J. 877 (1963) [hereinafter
cited as Emerson, Toward a General Theory].
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exploration and ... the affirmation of self." 2 9 This general view was most
notably advanced by Justice Douglas, who championed a reading of the first
amendment designed to secure "the autonomous control over the develop-
ment and expression of one's intellect, interests, tastes and personality." 130
The value of self-fulfillment through expression focuses solely on the role
of the speaker in the communication process and thereby implicates exclu-
sively speaker interests. The scope of protection thus associated with the value
is quite broad. Protection can never be denied on the ground that some other
speaker has made the point, or that other means of expression are available,
or that room for other viewpoints must be left in the marketplace of ideas.131
Because the speaker interest is implicated, however, the speaker's motiva-
tion becomes relevant. To advance the self-realization value, speech must
constitute a part of the development of the speaker's own personality through
some form of mental exploration or self-affirmation. 32 The value is thus a
subjective one, and determinations of whether it is advanced can only be made
by reference to the speaker's own mental processes.
33
3. Discovery of Truth. The third value underlying protection of freedom
of expression is that of the discovery of truth and advancement of knowl-
edge. 34 As with the political self-government value, the image is an old
one: Milton, in the seventeenth century, pictured truth and falsehood grap-
pling "in a free and open encounter."'' 35 John Stuart Mill argued that "the
peculiar evil of silencing the expression of an opinion is that it is robbing the
human race, posterity as well as the existing generation-those who dissent
from the opinion, still more than those who hold it." '38 The discovery value
is firmly entrenched in first amendment jurisprudence, 37 enshrined in the
"marketplace of ideas" metaphor that is frequently invoked to protect the
129. Emerson, Toward a General Theory, supra note 128, at 879. See First Nat'l Bank v.
Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 804-07 (1978) (White, J., dissenting); see also Baker, supra note 85; Z.
Chafee, supra note 85.
130. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 211 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring) (emphasis omitted),
131. L. Tribe, supra note 17, at 675.
132. See Emerson, Toward a General Theory, supra note 128, at 879. Many commentators
have argued that commercial speech is not deserving of protection in part because it does not
advance this value. See Jackson & Jeffries, supra note 9, at 14 ("Whatever else it may mean, the
concept of a first amendment right of personal autonomy in matters of belief and expression stops
short of a seller hawking his wares."); infra text accompanying notes 168-70.
133. See supra text accompanying note 87.
134. See generally Duval, Free Communication of Ideas and the Quest for Truth: Toward a
Teleological Approach to First Amendment Adjudication, 41 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 161 (1972).
135. Quoted in L. Tribe, supra note 17, at 576.
136. J.S. Mill, On Liberty 21 (Library of Liberal Arts ed. 1956) (1st ed. London 1859).
137. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1974); Red Lion Broadcasting
Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969); supra text accompanying notes 112-13. But see Central
Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 592 (1980) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) ("While it is true that an important objective of the First Amendment is to foster the
free flow of information, identification of speech that falls within its protection is not aided by the
metaphorical reference to a 'marketplace of ideas.' ").
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dissemination of both ideas 38 and information. 39  As Justice Holmes stated
in his dissent in Abrams v. United States,140
[W]hen men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths,
they may come to believe even more than they believe the very
foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is
better reached by free trade in ideas-that the best test of truth is the
power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the
market .... 141
The discovery value transcends the mere participants in the communication; it
advances the interests of the marketplace of ideas itself, and through that
marketplace the interests of the human race as a whole. 142 It thus reflects the
process interest.
The discovery value protects the transmission of information as well as
the expression of ideas and opinions.143 While the end served by the market-
place value is the discovery of truth in the realm of ideas, not that of facts,
speech conveying factual information does advance the value because that
speech provides the backdrop against which the search for ideological truth
can be more effectively carried out. With more factual background present,
the marketplace can better perform its function of ideological discrimination.
4. Development Through Perception. The fourth value protected by the
first amendment is that of individual development through perception. 44 It is
proposed that perception is at the core of personhood, and that the essence of
the development of the individual is the integration of new information and
ideas into the individual's own subjective world-picture. The individual mind
grows by assimilating information and ideas from the outside and integrating
them into a restructured cognitive framework. The protection of this individ-
ual development constitutes an underlying first amendment value; any majori-
tarian decision to limit the individual's ability to perceive is thus subject to
first amendment checks. 45
138. See, e.g., Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 372-80 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concur-
ring); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624-31 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
139. Cf. Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082, 1102 (1968) ("A primary First Amendment policy
has been to foster the widest possible debate and dissemination of information on matters of
public importance."), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 842 (1969).
140. 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
141. Id. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting). But see L. Tribe, supra note 17, at 577, suggesting
that free trade in ideas may not in fact generate truth, and that the right to differ about what is
truth may be subtly endangered by a theory that perceives the attainment of truth-and therefore
the banishment of error-as the sole purpose of communication. See also A. Meiklejohn, supra
note 38, at 88 ("Irihe winning of the truth is important .... But that is not our deepest need.").
142. J.S. Mill, supra note 136. Mill emphasized in this context that "[t]o discover to the
world something which deeply concerns it .... is as important a service as a human being can
render to his fellow creatures." Id. at 33.
143. See First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978). But see Gellhorn, The Right
to Know: First Amendment Overbreadth?, 1976 Wash. U.L.Q. 25, 27-28.
144. This section of the Note draws on the philosophical theories of Ernst Cassirer
(1874-1975). See generally E. Cassirer, Essay on Man (1953) [hereinafter cited as E. Cassirer,
Essay]; E. Cassirer, The Phenomenology of Knowledge (1957) [hereinafter cited as E. Cassirer,
Phenomenology]; The Philosophy of Ernst Cassirer (P. Schilpp ed. 1949).
145. See Neuborne, A Rationale for Protecting and Regulating Commercial Speech, 46
Brooklyn L. Rev. 437, 448-49 n.28 (1980) (but querying whether a sufficient link exists between
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The rationale for such a value can be found through an examination of
the process of the individual's construction of his world-picture. The individ-
ual begins by breaking up the continuous flow of sensory phenomena into
fixed, discrete perceptual units. These units serve as centers of orientation, as
bases for the structuring and determination of this internal picture of the
external world. 46 As the process continues, its result is an ever-sharper
description and differentiation of that perceptual universe. 47 The individual
is thus constantly building up a subjective picture of the external world,
"controlled by perceptions of facts and their relationships to one an-
other." 48 Goethe, describing this, wrote:
Truly the mental fleece
Resembles a weaver's masterpiece,
Where a thousand threads one treadle throws,
Where fly the shuttles hither and thither
Unseen the threads are knit together,
And an infinite combination grows. 49
Each perceived element of the external world is built up in the individual
mind as a phenomenal object; 0 by means of this personal symbolic universe,
the individual can translate and synthesize his own experience.'-' Informa-
tion about the external world constitutes the building blocks for this internal
world-picture; ideas constitute the structural framework linking these blocks,
by providing relations between facts. Images with pure emotional content, by
contrast, neither informational nor ideological, play no part in this scheme.
The process is at the core of what it means to be a perceiving, thinking being.
Ensuring the ability of the individual to partake of the process is, it is here
proposed, an underlying value beneath the first amendment.
commercial information and this process). Though commentators have in the past discussed
growth through the reception of speech, they have rarely focused precisely on the process
described here. See J. Dewey, Democracy and Education 6 (1916) ("[A]II communication... is
education. To be a recipient of a communication is to have an enlarged and changed experience.
One shares in what another has thought and felt and in so far, meagerly or amply, has his own
attitude modified."); Redish, supra note 42, at 438-39 ("[Tlhe mind develops when used, and
communication which stimulates the reader or listener to think, reason, know, consider, appreci-
ate, or imagine constitutes an exercise of this ability unique to man, and hence stimulates
development of it.").
146. Hamburg, Cassirer's Conception of Philosophy, in The Philosophy of Ernst Cassirer,
supra note 144, at 73, 97.
147. E. Cassirer, Phenomenology, supra note 144, at 114-15. In psychological terms, acquir-
ing knowledge from the outside world means a change in cognitive structure, involving new
connections or separations, differentiations or structuralizations of psychological areas within the
life space of the individual. See K. Lewin, Field Theory in Social Science 69-75 (1951).
148. J. Dewey, supra note 145, at 120 (defining the mind as purposive activity so controlled).
149. Quoted in Hartman, Cassirer's Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, in The Philosophy of
Ernst Cassirer, supra note 144, at 289, 304-05.
150. See E. Cassirer, Phenomenology, supra note 145 at 4-5 (describing Kantian theory).
151. E. Cassirer, Essay, supra note 144, at 278. See also Aristotle, De Anima, in The Basic
Works of Aristotle 590 (R. McKeon ed. 1941) ("Once the mind has become each set of its possible
objects .... its condition is still one of potentiality, but in a different sense from the potentiality
which preceded the acquisition of knowledge by learning or discovery: the mind is then able to
think by itself. " (emphasis in original)).
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Case support for the value is scant, but does reflect judicial willingness to
protect the individual's ability to grow through learning. First hints may be
found in Meyer v. Nebraska,5 2 in which the Court struck down a 1919 state
statute banning the teaching of any modern language other than English
below the ninth grade.1 53 The Court emphasized the "supreme importance"
of the acquisition of knowledge, 154 and suggested that the opportunities of
pupils so to acquire knowledge could not be interfered with. 55 These hints
were developed in further Supreme Court statements dealing with education,
including the opinion of the Court in Pierce v. Society of Sisters156 and its
recent opinions in Plyer v. Doe5 7 and Board of Education, Island Trees,
Union Free School District v. Pico.158
152. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
The meaning of Meyer has been the occasion of a great deal of controversy. The Court in
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), read Meyer and Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268
U.S. 510 (1925), to mean that "the State may not, consistently with the spirit of the First
Amendment, contract the spectrum of available knowledge," 381 U.S. at 482, and the case has
been cited in specific support of the first amendment rights of students, see Tinker v. Des Moines
School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969). In addition, however, the case has been characterized as
standing for economic due process principles and concerned essentially with the right to contract,
see Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 515-16 & n.7 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting); as
reflecting a general privacy right, see Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 685 (1977);
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973); and as basically concerned with family life and the parent-
child relationship, see Quillion v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978).
The Meyer Court refers in its discussion to three of these rights: "the calling of modern
language teachers," "the power of parents to control the education of their own," and "the
opportunities of pupils to acquire knowledge." 262 U.S. at 401.
153. The Court rested its holding on the liberty protected by the fourteenth amendment.
Courts of the 1920's, however, uniformly cited "liberty" and "due process" as the grounds for
striking down state statutes violating a bill of rights guarantee. See, e.g., Fiske v. Kansas, 274
U.S. 380 (1927) (striking down a state statute restricting speech on the ground that the restriction
infringed "the liberty of the defendant in violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment," id. at 387).
154. 262 U.S. at 400.
155. Id. at 401 ("the opportunities of pupils to acquire knowledge"); id. at 399 ("the right of
the individual.., to acquire useful knowledge").
156. 268 U.S. 510 (1925). The Court there struck down a state statute requiring that all
school-age children be sent to public schools, emphasizing the inability of the state to "standard-
ize" its children through mandating public education, and the importance of parental control
over education. Id. at 535. See also the various opinions in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205
(1972). The Court here recognized a free exercise interest of Amish parents exempting them and
their children from a state statute requiring school attendance until age 16. Justice Douglas,
dissenting, appeared to recognize in the Amish child an affirmative right to a public education
that his parents' wishes could not override. Id. at 245. He appears, however, to have been
motivated not so much by first amendment concerns as by a more general "right of students to be
masters of their own destiny," id., as well as by a fear that keeping Amish children out of school
because of their parents' religious views might constitute an establishment of religion, id. at 242.
Justice White, while concurring in the exemption from school attendance, placed great emphasis
on the state need to "nurture and develop the human potential of its children. . . to expand their
knowledge, broaden their sensibilities, kindle their imagination, foster a spirit of free inquiry, and
increase their human understanding and tolerance." Id. at 239 (White, J., concurring).
157. 50 U.S.L.W. 4650, 4655 (U.S. June 15, 1982).
158. 50 U.S.L.W. 4831 (U.S. June 24, 1982). While the Court has explicitly rejected the idea
that education-or at least education beyond a basic minimum-is a "fundamental right" for
equal protection purposes, San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), in Plyer it
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The value of development through perception focuses, of course, on the
listener interest; it thus incorporates the scope of protection associated with
that interest. The value is necessary because the discovery value, focusing on
the process interest, may often provide insufficient protection in those cases in
which no speaker interest can be asserted and the political self-government
value is not implicated. First, the emphasis of the discovery value on a broad
marketplace of ideas places a premium on public speech addressed to a wide
and general audience. 59 Speech may, however, advance individual growth
even where it is not addressed to the world at large. Where the speaker interest
is unavailable, 60 the discovery value may provide inadequate protection to
private speech.
Second, the discovery value, focusing as it often does on a metaphysical
marketplace of ideas, may tend to slight the flesh-and-blood actors in the
communications process. The discovery value may be insufficient to protect
listeners in cases where a listener's contribution to the communications mar-
ketplace of ideas is seen to be outweighed by the burden on the process of
including him. One example might be found in Bates v. State Bar,10 where
two of the dissenting opinions argued that the listener claim to receive attor-
ney advertising should be denied because of the burden on the communica-
tions process presented by the problem of policing attorney advertising. 0 2
appeared to treat public education as somehow quasi-fundamental, playing a special role in equal
protection jurisprudence. See 50 U.S.L.W. at 4655.
The Court's decision in Rodriguez is not inconsistent with the theory proposed here. A first
amendment principle that the government not unduly interfere with the individual's development
through perception and integration of new information does not necessarily imply an affirmative
obligation on the part of the government to contribute to that process through the medium of
public education.
159. For example, in Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919), in which Justice Holmes
so eloquently emphasized the value of "free trade in ideas," see supra text accompanying notes
140-41, the defendants had printed up and distributed some 5000 circulars promoting the cause of
solidarity with the Russian Revolution. Id. at 618-20.
There was thus no difficulty asserting a process interest in Red Lion, which involved a true
public marketplace of ideas, see supra notes 107-10 and accompanying text. Such a public
marketplace has been found in almost every case in which the Court has asserted a process
interest. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408
U.S. 753 (1972), and supra text accompanying note 113. In Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396(1974), where such a public marketplace was not found, the Court's claim that it was protecting
"a particular means of communication [prisoners' letterwriting] in which the interests of both
parties are inextricably meshed," id. at 409, does not ring true-the rest of the paragraph in which
that statement is found suggests that the Court was in fact attempting to protect listener interests
or non-first amendment privacy interests without saying so.
160. See, e.g., Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974) (speaker an imprisoned felon);
Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972) (speaker a nonresident alien); Lamont v. Postmaster
General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965) (same); see also Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (obscene
speech).
A prime example of speech where the speaker interest is unavailable is commercial speech, see
infra notes 168-70 and accompanying text.
161. 433 .. S. 350 (1977).
162. Id. at 387-88 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 395-97 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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Analysis based on the discovery value may emphasize the latter factor to the
detriment of the former. In that manner, the right to receive may not be
granted proper protection absent a first amendment value directly tied to the
listener interest. 16 3
The development-through-perception value, like other first amendment
values, does not establish any new constitutional rights independent of free-
dom of expression; rather, it is part of an attempt to answer the question of
why expression is accorded special protection under the first amendment.16 4
Each value supplies a partial answer to that question by describing a process,
uniquely linked with speech, that is basic to the development of the individual
or the preservation of a free society.16  Thus, speech is the express medium
of that process of self-realization through the sharing of information and
ideas that is protected by the self-expression value; that process of discovery
of truth through the encounter of opposing ideas that is protected by the
discovery value; that process of articulation, dissemination, and competition
of information and ideas relevant to political self-government that is protected
by the self-government value; and that process of taking in new information
and ideas and integrating them into the individual's world-picture that is
protected by the development-through-perception value. Speech is uniquely
suited to all of these processes; other forms of activity may serve the same
goals, but they do so incidentally and occasionally rather than by their na-
ture.' Thus, all of these processes are based on values that underlie the
constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech.
III. VALiUEs UNDERLYING AND INTERESTs FURTHERED BY PROTECTION OF
COMMERCIAL SPEECH
For speech to be within the first amendment preserve, it must advance
one or more of the four underlying first amendment values. Since commercial
speech does in fact promote three of the four values, it must be granted some
protection. 67  The scope of that protection, however, will be determined
through an analysis of the interests advanced by commercial speech.
163. See also the discussion of the marginal listener, supra note 115 and accompanying text.
164. Cf. Jackson & Jeffries, supra note 9, at 13 (Values should "capture in reliable summary
the dominant conceptions of the meaning of freedom of speech.").
165. The unique link with speech is crucial; thus while motorcycle riding may in fact
contribute to the individual growth of some persons, it does not deserve first amendment
protection on that ground. See Bork, supra note 79, at 127. But see Redish, supra note 42, at 444
("[Alttempts by the courts to choose a vehicle for rational development are an unwarranted
restriction of individual freedom.").
166. But see J. Dewey, supra note 145, at 321 (emphasis in original):
[T]here is no such thing as genuine knowledge and fruitful understanding, except as the
offspring of doing. The analysis and rearrangement of facts which is indispensable to the
growth of knowledge and power of explanation and right classification cannot be
attained purely mentally-just inside the head. Men have to do something to the things
when they wish to find out something ....
See also id. at 172.
167. Rationales for protecting commercial speech have been advanced that, if followed, lead
to protection on grounds other than the values identified in this Note, but none seems adequate to
sustain first amendment protection for commercial speech. Most prominently, the Court has
advanced economic efficiency and economic self-interest rationales for protection of commercial
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A. Values Advanced by Commercial Speech
Commercial speech advances the self-government, discovery, and devel-
opment-through-perception values. It does not advance the self-expression
value, because the speech that advances that value is speech motivated by the
need of people "to express their opinions on matters vital to them if life is to
be worth living,"' 16 speech that advances "the autonomous control over the
development and expression of one's intellect, interests, tastes and personal-
ity." 169  Commercial speech does not reflect that subjective need.1 70  The
hawking of wares constitutes no expression of the individual personality.
speech, see supra text accompanying notes 35-41. The economic efficiency theme, first enunciated
in Virginia Board, was addressed most recently in Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Serv.
Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 561-62 (1980). It has been adopted by some of the lower courts. See, e.g.,
Illinois Ass'n of Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 516 F. Supp. 1067, 1069 (N.D. 111. 1981). The
economic self-interest theme has been repeated as well by the Court, though in recent cases it has
been emphasized more by the minority. See Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 22-23 (1979)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 473-74 (1978)
(Marshall, J., concurring). Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 47 N.Y.2d 94, 390
N.E.2d 749, 417 N.Y.S.2d 30 (1979), the state level decision in Central Hudson, provides a useful
illustration of the scope of protection under this approach. That court found that since electrical
utilities operate in a noncompetitive market, and consumers have no choice regarding the source
of their electric power, electrical utility advertising does not increase the ability of the consumer to
make advantageous economic decisions. Thus, the court reasoned, the speech should not be
protected. Id. at 110-11, 390 N.E.2d at 757, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 38-39. The Supreme Court endorsed
the general approach but rejected the conclusion, finding that the consumer, in several markets,
needs information to decide whether to buy electricity on the one hand, or fuel oil or natural gas
on the other. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 567. The objections to both the economic interest and
the economic efficiency approaches, set out supra in text accompanying notes 38-41, are strong.
Professor Redish has advanced "personal self-government" and growth-through-decision-
making arguments for protection of commercial speech. In the first, he argues that the first
amendment demands that the consumer be presented with as much information as possible
concerning the relative merits of competing products so that he can "achieve the maximum degree
of material satisfaction permitted by his resources." Redish, supra note 42, at 433. He argues that
the same forces that lead us to protect speech directed towards political decisionmaking should
lead us to protect speech directed at private decisionmaking. After all, "much political activity is
directed to the betterment of the individual's material welfare." The "same basic goal"-that of
"improving [the] level of material satisfaction" of the individual-is implicated in both cases. Id.
at 443. This reasoning, though, misses the essential point of political freedom. Political freedom is
not an incidental means toward the goal of individual material satisfaction; it is an end in itself. It
is indispensable to the legitimacy of the individual's submission to the rule of the majority, and its
first goal is self-government, not good government. The good life, without more, is not a first
amendment value.
In Professor Redish's growth-through-decisionmaking argument, he contends that involve-
ment in decisionmaking advances the rational development of the individual, and that the
government cannot interfere with this vehicle for rational development. But rational develop-
ment, without more, proves too much to be a first amendment value, and is insufficiently
connected with speech. Many modes of activity may advance rational development, and yet are
surely outside the ambit of the first amendment.
Finally, arguments for protection have been made that rest on the difficulty of line drawing,
see supra note 42, or that reject entirely the approach of affording first amendment protection
only if it can be grounded on some "value," see supra note 79.
168. Z. Chafee, supra note 85, at 33.
169. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 211 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring) (emphasis omitted).
170. See T. Emerson, The System, supra note 128, at 311; Baker, supra note 85, at 3;
Jackson & Jeffries, supra note 9, at 14; cf. First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 804-05
(1978) (White, J., dissenting) (corporate political speech does not advance the expression value
and should therefore be less protected than other political speech). But see Redish, supra note 42,
at 446-47; The Supreme Court, 1979 Term, supra note 6, at 165.
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Protection of commercial speech does, however, advance the political
self-government value. On the one hand, it does not implicate the speaker
interests associated with that value, because the advertiser is not seeking to
contribute to political discussion: were he trying to do so, then his speech
could not properly be termed commercial.17 1 On the other hand, a different
standard applies when the process and listener interests associated with the
value are considered. The standard is no longer the subjective one of whether
the speaker wishes to contribute to political discussion. Rather, it is an objec-
tive one: whether the speech does in fact contribute to the formation of
political opinions among its hearers. Even though commercial speech does not
constitute a direct contribution to the interchange of political ideas, it satisfies
this standard because it transmits information and values that contribute to
the public's formation of political opinions.172
For many of the same reasons, commercial speech also advances the
discovery value. Since absolute truth is unattainable in any area of thought,
speech that conveys information in any area will advance the search for truth.
Informational speech, therefore, deserves discovery-value protection even
when the information conveyed appears mundane or unimportant. 173 Com-
mercial speech satisfies the test, 74 since it transmits information from adver-
tisers to consumers. 7 5 Because the test is an objective one, subjective factors
such as the speaker's commercial motivation are irrelevant. 7 6
171. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 761-62 (1976); see also supra note 2. Compare Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v.
Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 562 n.5 (1980), with id. at 580-81 (Stevens, J., concurring).
172. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 765; id. at 780 n.8 (Stewart, J., concurring); In re Bates, 113 Ariz. 394, 402-03, 555
P.2d 640, 648-49 (1976) (Holohan, J., dissenting), rev'd, 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
This indirect link allows commercial speech to advance the self-government value without
reaching the level of "political speech." Thus Jackson and Jeffries are overly limiting when they
conclude that expression not "essential to self-government" is "irrelevan[t] ... to the political
speech principle." Jackson & Jeffries, supra note 9, at 15.
173. Commercial speech is sometimes dismissed as not relating to important areas of knowl-
edge. A distinction is drawn between "true" rational knowledge, touching reality in an ultimate,
intellectual fashion, on the one hand, and knowledge dealing with everyday affairs, on the other;
"true" knowledge is purely theoretical and must not be debased by application to real behavior.
The concept is first found in classical philosophy and was reinforced in medieval thought:
"[K]nowledge is high and worthy in the degree in which it deals with ideal symbols instead of with
the concrete .... Experience ha[s] to do with mundane, practical and secular affairs, practically
necessary indeed, but of little import in comparison with supernatural objects of knowledge." J.
Dewey, supra note 145, at 310. The class basis of such a dichotomy is plain, id. at 389, and the
dichotomy itself is pernicious and untenable. Id. at 391. Establishment of such a hierarchy of
values is unacceptable; all studies and all knowledge, insofar as they contribute to experience,
have intrinsic and incomparable worth. Id. at 281.
174. Of course, not all advertising does transmit information. A great deal of advertising
emphasizes persuasional and noninformational techniques to the exclusion of useful facts about
the product. Most advertising, though, presents both information and persuasion, and a line
cannot reasonably be drawn between the two types. See Redish, supra note 42, at 433.
175. But see Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082, 1102 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (even though cigarette
advertising "implicitly states a position on a matter of public controversy," it "present[s] no
information or arguments in favor of smoking which might contribute to the public debate."),
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 842 (1969).
176. See Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 826 (1975).
19821
COLUMBIA LA W REVIEW
Since commercial speech conveys information, it advances the develop-
ment-through-perception value as well. Here, too, all speech that conveys
information advances the value. It is not a legitimate objection that commer-
cial information contributes to the development of the individual's world-
picture in an unimportant area, or that commercial information does not
sufficiently contribute at all. The first objection is based upon a misunder-
standing of the nature of the value; its goal is the continual differentiation and
development of the individual's perception of the external world, not the
encouragement of his knowledge and talents in some particular area. The
second objection implies that this cognitive development is a first amendment
goal only when "important" strides are made by the individual, but that
seems untenable-many little strides make one great one, and the government
cannot choose for the individual the information it thinks will benefit him
most. Since commercial speech promotes the perceptional development value,
it advances listener interests. Again the proper criterion is one of content; the
commercial motivation behind the speech cannot remove its value. 177
B. Scope of First Amendment Protection of Commercial Speech
Because commercial speech advances first amendment values, it deserves
first amendment protection. In contrast to other types of speech, however, it
implicates only process and listener interests; protecting commercial speech
does not foster any speaker interests that the first amendment recognizes. 78
This puts it in a unique position, since the protection of no other general class
of speech advances first amendment values without advancing speaker inter-
ests.
179
One consequence of that distinction is that balancing tests, where em-
ployed by a court considering restrictions on commercial speech, are skewed
toward suppression.8 0  Since commercial speech advances only listener and
process interests, a court applying a balancing test to determine the validity of
a restriction on commercial speech does not weigh the expressional interests of
a speaker against the interests of society in regulating speech; rather, it weighs
the interest of the public in hearing the speech against the interest of that very
same public in not hearing it. Under these circumstances, balancing a well-
177. An analogy can instructively be drawn to the Court's treatment of sexually explicit
speech in Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948). The Court wrote: "We do not accede to
appellee's suggestion that the constitutional protection for a free press applies only to the
exposition of ideas. The line between the informing and the entertaining is too elusive for the
protection of that basic right .... What is one man's amusement, teaches another's doctrine."
178. Of course, the interests of commercial speakers in making money will always be
advanced by protecting their speech, but mere economic interests should not be protected by the
first amendment. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 783-88 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); A. Meiklejohn, supra note 38; supra text
accompanying notes 38-41.
179. But see supra notes 90-101 and accompanying text for particular examples of speech
satisfying this test; see also the discussion of Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50
(1976), supra note 105.
180. See Comment, supra note 28, at 808-11.
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defined harm against an amorphous benefit, courts can rarely be expected to
strike down the restriction.' 8 '
More important, however, are the consequences of the absence of
speaker interests with respect to the legitimacy of specific types of regulation.
Restrictions on particular speakers or modes of speech are legitimate so long
as they do not interfere with reception of the information and ideas in
question from other speakers or via other modes of speech. However, sup-
pression of the content of speech, as in Central Hudson, is not permissible
except pursuant to a strict standard of scrutiny.
1. Regulation not Interfering with Reception of the Information or
Ideas. A restriction on particular commercial speech will always be valid
where the restriction does not interfere with the transmittal of the information
in question to the public, because of the existence of other speakers 182 or the
availability of alternative means.18 3 This constitutes a marked departure from
analysis in other first amendment areas in which the Supreme Court has
repeatedly held that speech cannot be suppressed simply because the substance
of the speech has been voiced by others, or because the speaker will be able to
convey his message by some other means. 8 4 This is because speaker interests
are paramount in traditional first amendment analysis. In commercial speech
analysis, by contrast, only listener and process interests need be protected.
Thus, where a restriction of commercial speech is at issue, the reviewing court
must determine whether the restriction will in fact cut back on the amount of
information or ideas getting through to the public.
85
181. See generally Goodale, Legal Pitfalls in the Right to Know, 1976 Wash. U.L.Q. 29;
Comment, supra note 28, at 808-10 ("first amendment protection for purely commercial speech
may be illusory").
182. Justice White, dissenting in First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978), suggested
that a state might be able to regulate corporate political speech, on the ground that "it is unlikely
that any significant communication would be lost by such a prohibition," but not corporate
commercial speech, since "[i]n the absence of advertising ... the ability of consumers to obtain
information relating to products manufactured by corporations would be significantly impeded,"
id. at 807-08.
183. See Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 102 S. Ct. 1186,
1192 (1982) ("We doubt that the village's restriction on the manner of marketing appreciably
limits Flipside's communication of information ... ."). But see Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S.
753, 765 (1972) (existence of alternative means to receive the restricted speech did not "extin-
guish ... altogether any constitutional interest ... in this particular form of access"); see also
Board of Educ., Island Trees Union Free School Dist. v. Pico, 50 U.S.L.W. 4831 (U.S. June 24,
1982). In both Kleindienst and Island Trees, the Court sought to protect only listener interests.
184. Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 163 (1939); see L. Tribe, supra note 17, at 603.
185. The Virginia Board Court implicitly made such a determination when it rejected Justice
Rehnquist's argument that no listener interests protected by the first amendment were implicated
since consumers could in theory collect and publishthe drug price information themselves.
Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 757
n.15 (1976); see supra note 102. That alternative, while acceptable in theory, was likely to have
been inadequate in practice. The Linmark Court similarly examined alternative means of
communicating that a house was for sale and found them "far from satisfactory." Linmark
Assocs. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 93 (1977). The Friedman Court argued that
even though trade names were to be banned, "the factual information associated with trade
names may be communicated freely and explicitly to the public" and that the regulation was on
that ground among others legitimate. Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 16 (1979). On the facts of
Friedman, however, the argument seems specious; the restriction, after all, was designed to put
the speaker out of business. See id. at 23 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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This analysis is helpful in scrutinizing congressional regulation of cigar-
ette advertising. 6  The ban on cigarette advertising over the electronic
media 18 7 is unobjectionable to the degree that the same content is conveyed to
the public through print media advertising. The requirement of a conspicuous
Surgeon General's warning, 88 or any other mandated disclosure,8 9 similarly
presents no first amendment issue since it in no way lessens the amount of
information communicated to the public. 90
2. Central Hudson-Type Regulation. In traditional first amendment
analysis, the suppression of speech because of its topic or point of view is
presumptively invalid. Strict scrutiny is necessary in such cases.' 9 ' Yet in
Central Hudson the Court implicitly recognized the validity of restrictions on
speech that not only regulate on the basis of content, but were promulgated
for the express purpose of influencing public behavior by preventing a specific
point of view from being communicated to the public. Such regulation can be
justified only if speech advancing listener and process interests exclusively is
more susceptible to content and viewpoint regulation than is speech that
advances speaker interests as well. In order to make that determination, it is
necessary to consider the bases for the traditional proscription of content
regulation.
Content-based regulations of speech have commonly been reviewed by
means of equal protection analysis. 9 2  Such restrictions implicate equal pro-
tection principles because they establish classifications of speakers based on
the content of their speech. 9 3 These classifications must be subjected to
careful scrutiny because of the fundamental nature of the first amendment
186. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340 (1976).
187. 15 U.S.C. § 1335 (1976).
188. 15 U.S.C. § 1333 (1976).
189. See, e.g., Warner-Lambert Co. v. FTC, 562 F.2d 749, 756-64 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 435 U.S. 950 (1978); Fur Products Labeling Act, § 4(2), 15 U.S.C. § 69b(2) (1976).
190. The mandatory warning is thus a prime example of a regulation that would raise serious
freedom-of-expression problems if speaker interests could be asserted, but raises no such prob-
lems precisely because no speaker interests protected by the first amendment can be found.
Of course, requiring an unreasonably large warning that eliminated space otherwise used to
convey commercial information not elsewhere available would implicate the first amendment.
191. Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 514-15 (1981); Consolidated
Edison v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 537-38 (1980); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455,
462-63 (1980).
192. Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980); Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50
(1976); Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972); Neimotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 284
(1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
Restrictions on speech are often attacked on equal protection and first amendment grounds
simultaneously. See Widmar v. Vincent, 102 S. Ct. 269 (1981); FCC v. Nat'l Citizens Comm. for
Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775, 801 & n.19 (1978); see also California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 138
(1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95-96 (1972).
193. See, e.g., Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 94-95 (1972).
The concept of "public forum" is often applied in this connection. The term is properly
limited to situations in which free speech is made available to some speakers, and thus the
classification leads to differential treatment. It excludes situations in which free speech is available
to nobody, and as a result there exists no differential treatment and no equal protection problem.
See Widmar v. Vincent, 102 S. Ct. 269, 273-74 (1981). Because free speech has traditionally been
available in the streets and parks, these are often referred to as public forums. See, e.g., Carey v.
Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 460 (1980); Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972). The concept has
often been misused. In United States Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453
U.S. 114 (1981), the Court used a finding of no public forum as the basis for a holding that no
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rights implicated.194  However, equal protection analysis is not applicable
where the speech in question does not advance speaker interests. Regulation of
such speech does not set up a classification on which an equal protection
analysis can be bottomed. There is no classification of speakers, since no
speaker interests protected by the first amendment exist. There is no classifica-
tion of listeners, since the nonspeaker interests protected by the self-govern-
ment, discovery, and perceptional-development values each reflect benefits to
the general public; particular segments of society are not disproportionately
benefited by a particular speech content.19 5 Thus, equal protection analysis
fails to establish a ground on which to proscribe Central Hudson-type regula-
tion of commercial speech.
Central Hudson-type regulation, nonetheless, cannot stand. Content-
based regulation is traditionally subject to direct first amendment attack' 96 in
two situations: those in which the government sets the agenda for public
discussion, and those in which the government favors certain viewpoints over
others.19 7 These barriers to government action arise directly out of the first
amendment, and operate regardless of whether the censored speech advances
speaker interests. 98 There is nothing in the nature of the listener or process
first amendment analysis at all was necessary, beyond a bare finding of reasonableness. This was
surely wrong, since the presence or absence of a public forum should not affect the need to apply
the usual balancing-test analysis given "time, place, and manner" restrictions on speech. See id.
at 2692 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
The term is also used to single out situations in which differential treatment of speakers is
necessary to avoid disruption of the operation of governmental facilities. Consolidated Edison v.
Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 538 (1980). These situations are described as ones where no
"public forum" can be found, and extremely relaxed scrutiny is applied. See Jones v. North
Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119 (1977); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976);
Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974). On a theoretical basis, this is incorrect.
Such a finding of necessity should be used as a basis for a holding that the strict scrutiny standard
is satisfied, not as an excuse for not applying the standard at all. But cf. Kleindienst v. Mandel,
408 U.S. 753, 767-70 (1972) (Congress's plenary power to exclude aliens found to be a justifica-
tion for applying only relaxed scrutiny of first amendment-based claims arising out of such an
exclusion).
194. Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 461-62 (1980). In Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San
Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981), the Court applied the principle with a vengeance, invalidating an anti-
billboard ordinance in part because the ordinance contained exceptions for religious symbols,
commemorative historical plaques, news, time and temperature signs, signs pertaining to an
official governmental function, and temporary political campaign signs. These exceptions should
properly be termed "frivolous," id. at 563 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
195. This would not be the case under the Court's "economic self-interest" argument. Given
such a value structure, "the poor, the sick, and particularly the aged" are indeed benefited
disproportionately by certain classes of commercial speech, Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 763 (1976), and an equal protection
analysis could be undertaken.
196. Compare Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 459 n.2, 459-71 (1980) (equal protection
analysis), with id. at 471 (Stewart, J., concurring) (first amendment analysis); Young v. American
Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 63-73 (1976), with id. at 84 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
197. See Board of Educ., Island Trees Free School Dist. v. Pico, 50 U.S.L.W. 4831, 4836
(U.S. June 24, 1982); Consolidated Edison v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 537-38 (1980)
(impermissible "to allow [the] government control over the search for political truth"); Cox v.
Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 581 (1965) (Black, J., concurring) (viewpoint-biased regulation "censor-
ship in a most odious form"); see also Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 552
(1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 481 (1980) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
198. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 575-78
(Blackmun, J., concurring); Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 701 n.28 (1977) (such
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interests, or speech advancing only those interests, that indicates why govern-
ment point-of-view favoritism should be permitted in that area more than in
any other. 99
Central Hudson-type regulation necessarily involves both viewpoint-bi-
ased regulation and regulation setting the agenda for public discussion. Cen-
tral Hudson itself provides an example. There, a government agency issued an
order banning advertising intended to promote electricity use.200 The regula-
tion was one explicitly based on the point of view of the speaker; it banned
speech intended to encourage energy use in order to promote a state policy of
energy conservation. Linmark Associates v. Township of Willingboro20 ' pro-
vides another example. There, the town's ordinance banning "For Sale" signs
in a racially changing community had two goals: one, to discriminate against
speech tending to emphasize the black influx into the community; the other, to
remove speech dealing with the changing nature of the community from the
public agenda of discussion.
Regulation of commercial speech designed to influence behavior by de-
priving citizens of information, as in these cases, inevitably involves one or
both of these proscribed restrictions. Thus, such regulation is impermissible
unless it can meet a strict scrutiny standard; the absence of speaker interests in
commercial speech does not mean that the government can violate basic
principles of viewpoint- and public-agenda-neutrality.
CONCLUSION
An analysis of the value structure underlying the first amendment reveals
that commercial speech significantly advances three of its four values and is
therefore worthy of protection. Its position is unique because the speech does
not advance any value implicating the interests of the speaker in the speech.
This leads to a curtailment of the scope of protection in important ways, such
as permitting the regulation of redundant speech. This unique position should
not, on the other hand, make true, nonmisleading speech any more amenable
than other types of protected speech to content-based restrictions designed to
influence the behavior of the public by limiting the information available to it.
Here, as elsewhere, such restrictions should be permitted only subject to a
standard of strict scrutiny.
Jonathan Weinberg
restrictions "clearly directed not at any commercial aspect of the prohibited advertising but at the
ideas conveyed and form of expression-the core of First Amendment values").
The Court in Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564 n.6, cited verifiability and durability as the
two features of commercial speech that "permit regulation of its content." Yet both of these,
while providing useful rationales for broad regulation of possibly misleading speech, provide no
grounds on which point-of-view-biased or public-agenda-setting regulation of commercial speech
can be justified. See id. at 574-79 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
199. Arguably, these proscriptions apply only to regulation of speech advancing the political
self-government value. This distinction, however, is unlikely to be important in practical terms,
since in most cases speech that the government seeks to suppress via content-based regulation
implicates political matters or the free exercise clause or some other independently protected
constitutional right.
200. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 559 (1980).
201. 431 U.S. 85 (1977); see supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
